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Introduction 
 
An important perceived threat of transnational organised crime is that well-
organised networks spread their wings across the globe (e.g. Williams, 
1994; Castells, 2000; Shelley et al., 2003; UNODC, 2010). In the Nether-
lands, these concerns focus particularly on the Italian mafia – here defined 
as the Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra and Sacra Corona Unita (SCU). 
Concerns were prompted by several indications. The Netherlands – to-
gether with Spain and Belgium – emerges from threat assessments as a 
European hub for shipments of cocaine coming in from South America and 
destined for Italy and the Dutch police also apprehend a relatively large 
number of mafia fugitives (Europol, 2017; Sarno, 2014). In 2011, the 
Dutch police studied the ‘Ndrangheta’s activities on Dutch territory and 
concluded that it represented a threat to the Netherlands (KLPD, 2011). 
Apart from that, the Italian mafia excites the imagination of many people 
and also piqued the interest of several Dutch enforcement officers. They 
were personally convinced that the Netherlands were attractive for these 
‘top dogs’ of organised crime to open subdivisions, and lobbied their su-
periors intensively for the chance to delve deeper into the issue.  
 In 2012, the Minister of Justice and Safety commissioned a project 
aimed at establishing the level of subversive activities of the Italian mafia 
in the Netherlands.2 The project was named Cerca Trova, which translates 
                                                          
1   The author is Professor of criminology at Tilburg University, The Netherlands 
2  In the Netherlands, serious and organised crime is now referred to as ‘onder-
mijnende criminaliteit’, which would translate into English as ‘undermining’, 
‘subversive’ or ‘disruptive’ crime, though none of these terms is exact. Gener-
ally, it points to illegal activities that disrupt the integrity of economic life and 
of financial and governing institutions, but it may also refer to degradation of 
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from Italian as ‘seek and you will find’, and ran from August 2012 to De-
cember 2015. This chapter will present an overview of the main outcomes 
of the Cerca Trova project in which the author participated as an external 
advisor. I will take the opportunity to discuss these results in the broader 
context of the debate on globalisation of organised crime. The next section 
starts with a brief overview of this discussion. Then, I will describe the 
methodology applied by the Cerca Trova project, as well as its general and 
specific outcomes. The latter refers to drug trafficking; violent crime; prop-
erty crime; investment in and misuse of legitimate activities; and the topic 
of mafia fugitives in the Netherlands, although it must be noted that hiding 
to escape prison is technically not a crime. I will also address the Italian 
mafia’s activities in the former Netherlands Antilles, although the Cerca 
Trova project itself was limited to the mainland Netherlands.  
 
 
Globalisation of organised crime: the debate 
 
Globalisation and the fear of transnational organised crime 
 
Globalisation is a process that can be defined as the intensification of eco-
nomic, political, social and cultural relations across borders (Holm and 
Sorensen, 1995). Since the early 1970s, globalisation has been considered 
a driver of prosperity, particularly in developing countries, but also a chal-
lenge, for instance for regulators, or even a threat, for example in the shape 
of uncontrolled migration from the global south to the global north (IMF, 
2008; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). Particularly since the early 1990s, 
globalisation has accelerated because of market liberalisation and the low-
ering of trade barriers, but also because of increased mobility and cheap 
travel, as well as rapid developments in information and communication 
technology, including the emergence of the Internet.  
 Although globalisation has been approached predominantly from a per-
spective of global markets, others have focused on the role of transnational 
                                                          
the environment and societal values. Although the term is most commonly 
used in the context of serious and organised crime, it also applies to corporate 
crime.   
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corporations. Scholars have also studied globalisation by looking at inter-
national networks of both large and small companies (Castells, 1996). 
From an international business perspective, multinational enterprises are 
considered a main agent of global integration, playing a pivotal role in link-
ing rich and poor economies, and in transmitting capital, knowledge, ideas 
and value systems across borders (Meyer, 2004). However, others empha-
sise that multinational enterprises are also responsible for annihilating lo-
cal firms; privatising resources such as drinking water; skimming off pub-
lic funds through tax avoidance; and speeding up the degradation of the 
environment, which effects are particularly visible in the global south (Bar-
ber, 1996; Carrington et al., 2018).  
 Since the 1960s, organised crime researchers have often approached the 
provision of illegal goods and services from an economic perspective, both 
in terms of markets and logistics (e.g. Schelling 1965; Becker, 1968; Sieber 
and Bögel, 1993). Such approaches often result in transposing develop-
ments in legitimate economies to the criminal underworld and, not surpris-
ingly, this also happened with the concept of globalisation. At the end of 
the 1980s, fear of an increase in transnational crime was also fuelled by the 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union 
(Van Duyne, 1996; Hignett, 2004). Furthermore, developments in infor-
mation and communication technology were expected to create new crim-
inal opportunities and lead to the modernisation of existing illegal markets. 
 Next, investigative journalists and former members of the enforcement 
community started to compare transnational criminal organisations with 
multinational enterprises in books with appealing titles such as ‘Octopus’ 
(Sterling, 1990), ‘McMafia’ (Glenny, 2009), and ‘Mafia Export’ (For-
gione, 2010). These books painted a picture of syndicates such as the Ital-
ian mafia, the Russian ‘Mafiya’, Chinese Triads and the Albanian mafia 
mimicking the behaviour of transnational corporations and setting up shops 
all over the world. From this perspective, mafias were compared to ‘inva-
sive exotics’, because their level of organisational effectiveness, their 
methods of violence and corruption, as well as their expertise at hiding 
illegal activities could not be matched by indigenous criminal groups, or 
countered by local enforcement authorities. From an academic perspective, 
‘global crime’ is more commonly approached in terms of networks and it 
is assumed that transnational organised crime groups, and particularly ma-
fias, have increasingly forged worldwide alliances (Raine and Cilluffo, 
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1994; Castells, 2000). These criminal networks are assumed to be highly 
flexible and able to move easily to other geographical areas and set up ac-
tivities wherever it is convenient (Williams, 2001; Shelley, 2005).   
 Fear of transnational organised crime has sparked a range of responses, 
of which at the global level, the United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organised Crime and the protocols thereto, which opened for sig-
nature in 2000, is a notable example. However, organised crime research-
ers have also been critical of the picture of organised crime spreading 
across the world (e.g. Van Duyne, 1996; Van Duyne and Nelemans, 2011; 
Campana, 2011; Varese, 2011; Van Dijk and Spapens, 2014). I will address 
these views below.  
 
A critical view on transnational organised crime from a market 
perspective  
 
Critiques of warnings that crime markets are internationalising can be sum-
marised as ‘what is new’? It can indeed be argued that, for instance, traf-
ficking of illegal substances, weapons, humans and non-human animals, as 
well as piracy and terrorism, have been going on for decades or even cen-
turies (Reichel and Albanese, 2014). The same applies to transnational 
property crime and fraud, which were topics for Interpol already in the 
1920s and 1930s (Bresler, 1992). In his memoirs, Dutch police commis-
sioner Kallenborn, for example, describes a case of jewellery thieves in the 
1920s who travelled across Europe to commit heists (Kallenborn, 1953). 
The notorious ‘Pink Panther’ gang, which originated from Serbia and 
robbed jewellery stores in Europe, Dubai and Japan between the mid-1990s 
and 2010, does not differ essentially from bands of international thieves 
operating as far back as the 17th and 18th centuries (Tremlett, 2010; Eg-
mond, 2004). The only major difference in terms of crossing borders is 
means of transport and speed of travel. In addition, it is almost impossible 
to identify modern transnational crimes that did not already exist in some 
form in the past (Reichel and Albanese, 2014). Even cybercrimes can 
mostly be considered updated methods for committing theft, fraud or ex-
tortion. Hacking someone’s online game to steal a valuable virtual sword 
may perhaps not have been possible without the Internet and computers, 
but in the end it is simply a theft, which probably causes similar harm to a 
victim as stealing his watch. 
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 What has changed, however, is the scale and diversity of transnational 
illegal markets (Dandurand et al., 1998; Reichel and Albanese, 2014). For 
example, thresholds for entering an illegal activity have been lowered. A 
person who is interested in producing some type of synthetic drug may 
nowadays order quantities of chemicals online, either on the open web or 
on the ‘dark’ web, and receive these by postal package. ‘Silk road’ was an 
example of a hidden website where users could order all sorts of narcotic 
drugs (Shelley and Hirst, 2017). Illegal online gambling is now estimated 
to be one of the most lucrative black markets (Havocscope, 2018). In the 
1970s, it would probably have been a local drug addict who stole your car 
radio, but nowadays the perpetrator may have come from anywhere in the 
world. Recently in the Netherlands, the police even apprehended a group 
of criminals who had flown in from Chile for the sole purpose of commit-
ting burglaries (Voskuil, 2018). Increased economic prosperity in, for ex-
ample, Asia also led to growing demand for protected wildlife products, 
such as ivory (as a status symbol), and plants and animal products (for use 
in traditional medicine), with disastrous effects on populations of endan-
gered species not only in Asia itself, but also in Africa and South America 
(Van Uhm, 2016). 
 Concerns about the consequences of the fall of the Iron Curtain proved 
to be generally correct, although these effects were sometimes temporary 
and certainly not as apocalyptic as some expected. In fact, the whole of 
Eastern Europe certainly did not develop into a hotbed of organised crime. 
But nevertheless, types of crime and victims, hardly occurring before, 
emerged at various spots: some temporarily others more permanent. Hun-
garian, Romanian and Bulgarian women do represent a substantial percent-
age of victims of exploitation as prostitutes in Western European countries 
(Nationaal Rapporteur, 2014; UNODC, 2016). In the 1990s, substantial 
quantities of small arms and light weapons leaked from stockpiles in for-
mer Soviet and Yugoslavian states. Arms traffickers such as Viktor Bout 
shipped large numbers of military weapons to conflict zones, mainly in 
Africa (Farah and Braun, 2006). Handguns, but also automatic weapons 
and explosives stemming from the Balkans and other Eastern European 
countries, ended up in the hands of criminals and terrorists in Western Eu-
rope (Duquet and Goris, 2018). It is also clear that itinerant gangs from 
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Eastern and South-Eastern Europe seized the opportunity to commit prop-
erty crimes in the West, and such groups are still active today (Spapens, 
2008; Van Gestel, 2014).   
 
A critical view on transnational crime from the perspective of 
criminal organisations 
 
Criminologists have generally been far more critical of the idea that glob-
alisation would enable criminal organisations to develop into multinational 
enterprises. Firstly, organised crime trading may be highly international, 
but it is also firmly embedded locally (Hobbs, 1998; Varese, 2011; Von 
Lampe, 2016). This is even more the case for mafia-type organisations than 
for trafficking networks (Gambetta, 1993; Chu, 2000). A criminal group 
that wants to establish a subdivision abroad must therefore be able to deal 
with circumstances that may be very different from those at home.  
 Secondly, practitioners and academics disagree about the level of or-
ganisation of mafias, especially on the question whether single groups or 
clans are governed by some overarching body and thus operate as a coor-
dinated entity that would resemble a national or transnational corporation. 
When we look at the Italian mafia, for example, investigative journalists 
and current and former law enforcement officials mostly assume that such 
ruling bodies exist: the Cosa Nostra’s two Cupola and the ‘Ndrangheta’s 
Crimine or Provincia. However, academics do not agree that these repre-
sent some form of higher management (e.g. Paoli, 2014). For example, the 
Camorra and SCU do not have comparable Commissions; the Cupola were 
established only in the 1950s and the Crimine not even before the 1990s 
(Dickie, 2013; Sciarrone, 2014). The Cosa Nostra’s Cupola were estab-
lished upon American advice mainly because the heroin trade required fi-
nancial investments which were beyond the reach of a single clan (Dickie, 
2013). Later, their main function was to prevent or solve violent conflicts 
between the clans, which sometimes caused hundreds of deaths. Indeed, 
such internal wars do not as such support the image of a well-managed 
syndicate.  
 Of course, examples of mafia groups establishing themselves on foreign 
territory did and still do exist, but without exception these concern single 
clans and individual members, and proof that a ‘top management’ is steer-
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ing global expansion is missing (e.g. Campana, 2011). Furthermore, Va-
rese (2011) concludes that criminals move to another country not because 
of choice but because of necessity, for instance because they were forced 
to leave their country of origin which because of police attention or fellow 
criminals had become a too hot place. In practice, when foreign crime 
groups develop illegal activities on foreign territory voluntarily, we can 
observe two basic mechanisms. The first is through immigrant communi-
ties; the second is through affiliation with indigenous criminal groups. In 
practice, these mechanisms are often entwined to some extent.  
 Germany, Canada and Australia, for example, have substantial immi-
grant communities stemming from Calabria and indications exist that this 
allowed ‘Ndrangheta clans to establish cells (‘ndrine) there (Forgione, 
2010; Gratteri and Nicasso, 2007). Mafia members extort the locals and 
may force them to support other illegal activities, for instance by making 
available housing and transport, often under threat of retribution against 
family members who reside in the country of origin. Comparable methods 
can be observed, for example, within Albanian and Chinese immigrant 
communities in Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively (Farcy 2002; 
Spapens 2008). However, ‘outsiders’ are usually not targeted for extortion 
because they cannot be intimidated in similar ways.   
 Thirdly, instead of battling indigenous crime groups for territories or 
markets, it will usually be more lucrative for foreign groups to seek coop-
eration. Alliances may be ad-hoc, for instance to organise a shipment of 
illicit goods, but may develop further over time. An example is synthetic 
drugs production in the Dutch-Belgian border area. Here, Dutch criminal 
groups started to set up laboratories from the beginning of the 1990s on-
wards (Van Duyne, 1995). These activities were established in cooperation 
with Belgians, although in most cases they were led by Dutch criminals, 
but gradually an integrated criminal network emerged (Spapens, 2006; 
2008; Colman et al., 2018).  
 The idea of foreign criminal groups as ‘invasive exotics’ can also be 
challenged. The main assumptions seem to be that newcomers are more 
violent and better at hiding their activities, which gives them the advantage 
over indigenous criminals and law enforcement. However, applying vio-
lence is not the smartest thing to do and there seems to be little reason why 
local criminals should not quickly be able to match foreign groups in this 
respect (Van Dijk and Spapens, 2014). Secondly, newcomers may instead 
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be even less effective in screening off their activities in a new environment, 
for instance when they are unfamiliar with local law enforcement tactics. 
In the 1990s, for example, American buyers who were sent to the Nether-
lands to acquire large quantities of ecstasy pills were not accustomed to the 
Dutch police’s extensive wiretapping and, despite ample warnings from 
their Dutch suppliers, they persisted in talking too much over the phone 
(Spapens, 2006).  
 If foreign criminal groups establish themselves in countries where law 
enforcement is weak, the situation may, however, be different. An example 
is the Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 gang, which was originally formed by 
El Salvadorian youths in Los Angeles in the 1980s. Large numbers of its 
members were expelled to El Salvador – for the moment I will leave aside 
that because of this they were technically not foreigners – and continued 
with criminal activities there, to which the government, weakened by civil 
war, was unable to respond effectively (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 2014). 
Furthermore, MS-13 also established itself in other Central American 
countries, such as Honduras and Guatemala, whilst retaining a strong pres-
ence in the United States.  
 Outlaw motorcycle gangs might be brought up as another example of 
syndicates that succeed in setting up chapters in different parts of the 
world. However, these chapters are mostly composed of local members 
who are not under foreign leadership. It is unclear to what extent such chap-
ters are directly ‘managed’ from abroad or remain instead relatively inde-
pendent in choosing their criminal and other activities. The latter option 
seems to be more realistic (UNODC, 2002). Furthermore, OMCG chapters 
may be heavily involved in crime, but they are also highly visible. All in 
all, these gangs do not seem to qualify very well as invasive exotics who 
may someday succeed in replacing local criminals. 
 In conclusion, globalisation has obviously increased opportunities for 
transnational organised crime on the one hand, but on the other, we must 
not forget that especially mafia-type illegal activities, such as protec-
tion/extortion and collusion with authorities to acquire public funds, are 
deeply embedded in local settings. In the remainder of this paper, I will 
look at activities of Italian organised crime in the Netherlands and then 
reflect on these findings from the perspectives described above. The next 
section first discusses data collection.  
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Cerca Trova: data collection and analysis 
 
Cerca Trova operated as a joint team composed of staff of the Dutch police, 
the tax authorities, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service 
(FIOD), and the Public Prosecution Service. It consisted of practitioners, 
i.e. experienced detectives, intelligence analysts of different agencies, stu-
dents at the police academy who did research for the team in the context of 
their bachelor thesis, and a public prosecutor. Several members of the team 
were fluent in Italian, and some already held extensive knowledge about 
the Italian mafia out of personal interest. The present author was attached 
to the project to provide advice and safeguard scientific quality and edited 
the final report (Cerca Trova, 2017).  
 The aim of the project was first to produce a reliable intelligence pic-
ture, which was to be made available to the Dutch Parliament in an anon-
ymised and public format. Second, the team was to support regular inves-
tigative work related to Italian organised crime. In practice, this meant that 
team members acted as intermediaries between Italian and Dutch enforce-
ment agencies in ongoing cross-border cases, and provided information to 
regular Dutch police investigation teams for further consideration.  
 The team relied for the most part on information available from the 
Dutch police and the judiciary, the Tax Administration and administrative 
agencies, as well as on information coming from Italy in letters rogatory. 
Team members also collected open source information and conducted in-
terviews with practitioners in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and It-
aly, as well as with five academic researchers of Italian organised crime. 
Cerca Trova’s preliminary findings were presented to, and discussed with, 
Italian law enforcement officials during visits to Rome and Reggio Ca-
labria in January 2015.  
 Data collection resulted in a database of 276 mafia-related crime cases 
which were investigated from 1989 to 2014. Most cases were initially re-
trieved from a database of requests for mutual legal assistance kept by the 
Dutch police liaison post in Rome, to which information was added from 
case files and intelligence sources; interviews with detectives who were 
involved (if necessary); and open sources.  
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a. The past and present of Italian mafia activities in  
 the Netherlands   
 
The presence of the Italian mafia in the Netherlands has been documented 
since the 1970s. At that time, the Camorra, for example, acquired illegal 
cigarettes in Rotterdam, which were smuggled to, and sold in, Italy (Arlac-
chi, 1993, p. 123). In 1992, the Dutch police analysed 30 investigation 
cases related to Italy which mainly concerned cocaine trafficking, but also 
money laundering, murder and small-scale arms trafficking (CRI, 1992). 
Mafia-affiliated individuals had started Italian restaurants as early as in the 
1980s and these establishments became meeting places for members of the 
Italian criminal underworld who visited the Netherlands, whilst some own-
ers were themselves actively involved in the drug trade. The police ob-
served links with several clans of the Camorra, such as the Annunziata, the 
La Torre and the Stolder clans, whereas other restaurant owners could also 
be linked to the Cosa Nostra (CRI, 1992).  
 In 1995, a research group drew a picture of organised crime in the Neth-
erlands in the context of a parliamentary enquiry (Tweede Kamer, 1995). 
Information on the Italian mafia, however, was scarce, because only one 
substantial investigation had been completed since 1992. This operation, 
codenamed Campina (Camorra-Pizzeria-Naples), had confirmed earlier 
findings that the Camorra was involved in trafficking cocaine from the 
Netherlands to Italy. Camorra representatives bought the drugs on behalf 
of different clans, and sometimes for other mafia groups as well. Small and 
medium-sized shipments were transported by road with couriers, some-
times hidden between flowers, whereas larger shipments were allegedly 
sent to Southern Italy by ship. Mafia members met in Italian restaurants 
with Colombian, Turkish, Surinamese and Netherlands-Antillean drug 
suppliers (Tweede Kamer, 1995). However, the research group found no 
indications that Italian organised crime had managed to set up a permanent 
bridgehead in the Netherlands. In 2001, the police updated its 1992 analy-
sis, but this brought no additional insights. Almost 10 years later, the police 
published a new report which focused specifically on the ‘Ndrangheta 
(KLPD, 2011). This report was again based on police information, but also 
on a substantial number of interviews with Italian and other enforcement 
representatives. As mentioned above, the Cerca Trova project was the most 
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recent effort to draw a picture of the Italian mafia’s activities on Dutch 
territory.  
 The Cerca Trova team compiled a database spanning a period of 25 
years, and Table 1 presents an overview of the type of activities mentioned 
in these files for mutual legal assistance. In total, 461 different illegal ac-
tivities were mentioned. Almost 60% of mafia-related activities concerned 
different types of narcotic drugs, mostly cocaine. Remarkably, only 2% of 
the cases involved synthetic drugs, although the Netherlands are viewed as 
a main producer of ecstasy and amphetamine (Tops et al., 2018). Other 
activities mentioned relatively often are money laundering and the hiding 
of mafia members from the Italian authorities in the Netherlands.  
 
Table 1 
Illegal activities mentioned in requests for mutual legal assistance 
(1989–2014) 
 
Illegal activity Number % 
Cocaine  131 28  
Cannabis and hashish  34 7  
Heroin 3 1  
Synthetic drugs 10 2  
Narcotic drugs unspecified 113 25   
Money laundering 40 9  
Mafia fugitives 37 8  
Violent crimes/murder/firearms 14 3  
Fraud 12 3  
Extortion 9 2  
Other 27 6  
Unknown 31 7  
Total 461 100 
 
Although the cases are mafia-related, only 68% of the subjects mentioned 
held either Italian or Dutch nationality (both 34%). Italian-Dutch criminal 
cooperation which involves mafia members is more international than that. 
German, Spanish, Belgian and Colombian nationals account for another 
14%. In total, 61 different nationalities were mentioned in the case files, 
showing the interconnectedness of transnational criminal networks. The 
next sections address the main types of illegal activities.  
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b. Drug trafficking 
 
The database shows that Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta are prominent in the 
context of drug trafficking. They account for 90% of the cases in which a 
specific mafia was mentioned. By comparison, the roles of Cosa Nostra 
(4%) and Sacra Corona Unita (6%) are modest. In half and a third of the 
cases, respectively, Cosa Nostra and SCU cooperated with the Camorra. 
Cooperation between Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta is less common, and was 
observed in only 6 cases. Earlier research showed that different clans invest 
together in drug shipments and Cerca Trova again confirmed this (Tweede 
Kamer, 1995; KLPD, 2011). Available information shows that the Nether-
lands is not the territory of specific clans.  
 The Netherlands and Spain are the main European ports of entry for 
cocaine (Europol, 2013). The case files did not reveal why Italian mafias 
use the Netherlands (and Spain) for this purpose and do not ship cocaine 
directly from South America to Italy. According to Italian law enforcement 
officers, this could be explained by the fact that ports in Italy are under 
much stronger surveillance than the Dutch and Spanish harbours. This ex-
planation is not very convincing, however, because the long Italian coast-
line presents ample opportunity to circumvent ports altogether and pick up 
and deliver shipments with small motorboats, for example. Occasionally, 
cocaine shipments are indeed intercepted in Italy, for instance in 2010 
when police seized 1.000 kilos in a Calabrian port. Strangely, the press 
reported that the shipment was destined for the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom instead of Italy (De Gelderlander, 2010). However, in almost all 
cases the cocaine shipped through the Netherlands was destined for Italy.  
 Mafia-affiliated Italian immigrants and fugitives who hide in the Neth-
erlands play an important role in maintaining contacts with Dutch criminal 
groups. It is unknown whether Dutch criminals were solely hired to take 
care of shipments, or invested in cocaine together with the mafia and other 
groups. Dutch criminals know their way around the ports and possibly also 
maintain contacts with corrupt Customs officials. Several cases of corrup-
tion in the port of Rotterdam have come to light in recent years (Rovers, 
2018).  
 Police observations of meetings suggest that the mafia also does busi-
ness directly with Colombian suppliers. These meetings may concern in-
coming shipments, but it is also possible that business relations have 
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evolved to the extent that orders can be placed directly with representatives 
of cocaine producers who reside in the Netherlands and no longer require 
to visit to Colombia. In the few cases in which the mafia seemed to operate 
independently from Dutch criminals, Albanians and Romanians removed 
the drugs from containers that had arrived in the port of Rotterdam, whilst 
mafia members monitored the operation from a distance. Entering con-
tainer terminals illegally by simply climbing over a fence and removing 
packets of drugs from containers before they go through customs is a rather 
crude method. The risk of getting caught is substantial, because entry to 
these terminals is guarded with fences, cameras and other detection equip-
ment, which seems to suggest that cooperation with Dutch criminals who 
do not need to apply such cowboy methods is indeed a safer bet.  
 Drugs that have entered the Netherlands are usually forwarded to Italy 
by road, either by couriers in private vehicles or hidden between truckloads 
of regular goods such as flowers and fruit. Because of the abolition of fixed 
border controls in the Schengen area – most of the European mainland – 
traffickers do not need to take extensive measures to conceal illicit goods, 
because the risk of being stopped and searched is almost zero if one drives 
carefully and avoids weekend nights (Spapens, 2008). Individual ship-
ments tend to be relatively small, often just a few up to several tens of kilos, 
and can easily be hidden in empty spaces in private cars, for example in 
the doors.  
 Couriers, usually young males who reside in Italy but hold all sorts of 
nationalities, receive an airline ticket to the Netherlands and some pocket 
money to enjoy a few days of leisure, and are then tasked with driving a 
car back in which drugs are hidden. Smuggling drugs between flowers is 
also an effective method because flowers are distributed to even the small-
est villages. The police are aware of this method, but they will only stop 
and search a transport when they are certain that the cargo contains drugs, 
because flowers are both valuable and vulnerable and if nothing illegal is 
found, the authorities will face substantial claims for damages.    
 
c. Violent crime on Dutch territory 
 
Italian organised crime is reputed for its violence. Cerca Trova, therefore, 
expected that mafia presence on Dutch territory would be visible in under-
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world killings. Between 1988 and 2014, 13 persons were the victim of ma-
fia-initiated murders, including one case in which the Dutch police inter-
vened and prevented the killing.3 In addition, Cerca Trova identified four 
possible murders, three of which were mentioned by crown witnesses in 
statements but could not be confirmed because no bodies were ever found. 
The fourth case concerned the suicide of a Camorra fugitive in which there 
were indications that he was in fact murdered. Except in two cases, all ac-
tual or possible murders were committed before 2002, especially by the 
SCU (six, possibly eight) and the Camorra (five, all before 1992). Most 
killings were drug-related, or appeared to be, for instance because subse-
quent investigation pointed to business conflicts related to drugs or theft 
(‘ripping’) of drugs. 
 Acts of punishment could rarely be identified, because in a relatively 
large number of cases, the police were unable to collect sufficient evidence 
to allow a conviction, and in some cases, perpetrators managed to escape 
long prison terms by becoming a collaboratore di giustizia, the most nota-
ble example being Filippo Cerfeda, a SCU member who killed four people 
in the Netherlands. Giorgio Basile, another pentito, also confessed to an 
unknown murder (Ulrich, 2005). 
 All in all, the level of mafia violence on Dutch territory is rather limited 
and almost no killings have taken place in the past 16 years, which seems 
to underline that its members prefer to stay under the radar and avoid at-
tracting attention to the drug trade. The fact that the SCU was held respon-
sible for most killings is also an indication of unplanned violence because 
its members have a reputation for lack of discipline (Massari, 2014).  
 Some members of the Cerca Trova team assumed that the mafia has 
simply become better in hiding its murders, for instance by disguising them 
as suicides or by employing non-Italian killers. However, looking into sev-
eral potentially suspicious killings which involved suspects or victims of 
Italian nationality or descent did not produce any connections with mafia 
clans. On the one hand, this still does not rule out that the mafia ordered 
murders of non-Italians and hired non-Italians to commit them. On the 
                                                          
3  In 2017, after Cerca Trova was finished, one more mafia murder was commit-
ted, which could be attributed to a conflict in Italy. The victim had unsuccess-
fully sought refuge in the Netherlands.  
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other hand, underworld killings are often also meant as a message and it 
will be at least partly ineffective if no one knows who sent it.  
 
d. Property crimes 
 
In Italy, the mafia is well-known for committing property crimes. Extortion 
of legitimate businesses is generally seen as a classic mafia-style crime, 
but its members are also involved in other types of property crimes. The 
Cerca Trova database contained 28 examples of property crimes, with 
fraud (12) and extortion (9) being the largest categories.  
 At first glance, extortion seems to be a relatively large category, but in 
fact none of these cases took place on Dutch territory. All but one con-
cerned investigations of extortion committed in Italy by mafia members 
who had fled to or took up residence in the Netherlands. The remaining 
case involved a restaurant owner who was also a drug dealer and the police 
established that extortion had in fact been a financial conflict with a SCU 
member because of a failed transaction. 
 In the 1990s, there had been indications that the mafia extorted Italian 
restaurants in the Netherlands, but these had been too vague to lead to fur-
ther investigation. Cerca Trova did not find or receive more recent signals 
of mafia-related extortion. It must be noted that this type of crime is diffi-
cult to detect because the victims are often reluctant to report it to the po-
lice. The team therefore looked at cases in which Italian restaurants or busi-
nesses owned by Italian nationals became the victim of inexplicable vio-
lence or arson, which might indicate an unwillingness to pay protection 
money or refusal to buy specific ingredients from ‘designated’ companies 
in Italy. The Bundeskriminalamt had observed the latter in investigations 
in Germany. However, this rendered only one case in which a recently 
opened restaurant was severely damaged for no apparent reason, but mafia 
involvement could not be established. In 2017, the Dutch police issued a 
press release about another case in which two restaurants were attacked, 
after which an Italian national was arrested in Spain, but again no mafia 
affiliation was mentioned (Nationale politie, 2017).   
 In 2016, a major criminal investigation in the Netherlands made clear 
that the brothers Vincenzo and Giuseppe Crupi, who the Italian police saw 
as members of the ‘Ndrangheta’s Commisso clan, controlled a Dutch 
flower export company. The Dutch police assumed that this company was 
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originally established for trafficking drugs, but that the owners had now 
also expanded to a range of property crimes (Anesi et al, 2017; De Jong 
and Voskuil, 2017). The most important of these was long firm fraud: the 
company ordered large quantities of flowers from Dutch suppliers but 
failed to pay the bills. Several suppliers went bankrupt as a result, and rep-
resentatives who called for payment received serious verbal threats, alt-
hough this did not scare them from reporting to the police. In addition, the 
investigation also linked suspects to bankruptcy fraud and VAT fraud, as 
well as to the fencing of expensive Swiss chocolate. The case also led to a 
large-scale investigation in Calabria and the Italian authorities seized assets 
to the value of €30 million. In Italy, the clan had invested money in 13 
flower companies, 21 stores, 22 apartments and two hotels (De Jong and 
Voskuil 2017). The ‘Ndrangheta is allegedly still active in the Dutch 
flower trade: another person originating from Calabria started a new busi-
ness and employs most of the former staff of the mafia-controlled company 
(De Jong and Voskuil, 2017). However, new instances of fraud involving 
this company have so far not been reported, although flower traders must 
remain highly alert for Italian buyers who never pay their bills.  
 
e. Investments in and misuse of legitimate businesses  
 
The flower trade is one trade sector in which Italian organised crime in-
vested in the Netherlands. Another sector that appeared to be vulnerable is 
the Italian catering sector. Analyses indicated that 22 Italian restaurants 
might be associated with the mafia (out of 1.205 venues). The project team 
was unable to determine whether the venues were specifically set up by the 
Italian mafia to facilitate criminal activities in the Netherlands or instead 
to launder money. In three cases, existing or former restaurant owners were 
convicted of mafia membership in Italy; in eight cases, police information 
showed that mafia members used the venue as a meeting place; and in a 
further eight cases, officers observed contacts between the owner and 
known mafia members. The remaining restaurant owners were suspected 
of involvement in serious or organised crime and the venues were fre-
quented by criminals active in the drug trade, but no direct mafia links 
could be established.  
 Analysis also showed no indications of large-scale mafia-initiated in-
vestments or fraud schemes in other economic sectors in the Netherlands. 
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However, there were at the time several cases under investigation in which 
the Italian mafia was suspected of having used Dutch companies and fi-
nancial service providers as intermediaries to move capital to and from It-
aly. The Netherlands has many Trust Offices (legal entities, partnerships 
or natural persons that provide one or more trust services on a commercial 
basis), which are vulnerable to being misused for this purpose. In one case 
under investigation, capital originating from different countries was in-
vested in companies that wanted to buy real estate the Italian authorities 
had earlier seized from the mafia. Dutch legal persons represented by a 
Trust Office in Amsterdam participated in these companies to the value of 
€2 billion. This and a few other, similar, cases are still under investigation 
in the Netherlands and Italy, but at the time of writing, enforcement agen-
cies had not been able to produce concrete evidence of mafia-related 
money laundering.  
 In Italy, the mafia is known to be involved in procuring government 
contracts, particularly for construction work in which mafia-controlled 
companies can acquire contracts via corrupt local or other officials. To curb 
this problem, the Italian authorities have implemented anti-mafia legisla-
tion that includes thorough screening of any private company that wants to 
work for the government or apply for a subsidy. Setting up a company in 
another EU Member State may make it possible to circumvent these back-
ground checks. Within the current legal framework, it is difficult to ex-
change police intelligence, on which effective screening often depends, for 
purposes other than criminal investigation; but this case concerned admin-
istrative screening (Spapens et al., 2015). In one concrete example, the 
Italian authorities requested background information on a Dutch company 
that was hired to do installation work at the Milan Expo, but this was re-
fused by the Dutch public prosecution service because of a lack of clarity 
regarding the legal provisions for mutual assistance in criminal matters 
(Spapens et al., 2015). Although this situation presents a loophole to crim-
inals, Cerca Trova did not find examples of Dutch companies that might 
have been set up to avoid anti-mafia background checks in Italy.   
 
f. The Netherlands as a hiding place for mafia fugitives  
 
Finally, the Cerca Trova project looked at mafia fugitives who use the 
Netherlands as a hiding place. Over the years, a relatively large number of 
276 
 
wanted mafia members have been apprehended in the Netherlands. Be-
tween 1992 and 2014, the Dutch authorities arrested 55 mafia members 
who had been living there for shorter or longer periods. The Italian author-
ities provided information on a further 38 individuals who could not be 
traced in time. Most fugitives were members of the ‘Ndrangheta and Ca-
morra. Cosa Nostra members are relatively rare. According to Italian en-
forcement officers we interviewed, they usually choose to hide in Sicily. 
Fugitives do not belong to specific clans, although a relatively large num-
ber were members of the Calabrian Strangio-Nirta clan.  
 The media usually refer to apprehended mafia members as kingpins but 
in fact they are mostly lower to middle-ranking within their clans. The 
leaders prefer to stick close to their territory in Italy. Although the relative 
number of latitanti is higher than in all other European countries except for 
Spain, the Cerca Trova project was unable to establish with certainty why 
the Netherlands is attractive to mafia fugitives. Apprehended suspects log-
ically provide no information on this. From interviews with enforcement 
officers, two potential explanations arise.  
 The first is that fugitives usually choose countries where they feel at 
home to some extent. Latitanti who went to the Netherlands had probably 
visited the country before and established contacts with persons who were 
willing to help them organise their stay, for instance by discreetly provid-
ing housing and a job. Apart from using a false identity, many took no 
specific precautions to avoid being found and worked, for instance in an 
Italian restaurant, or had their own business. Others received social bene-
fits, one person even in his own name. Apparently, most fugitives felt com-
pletely safe, except for those who were hunted by rival clans. Although the 
Dutch weather is usually less attractive than that of Spain, for example, and 
cultural and language barriers may be greater, the country’s international 
orientation, its excellent infrastructure and airline connections with Italy, 
as well as the fact that almost all Dutch think positively of Italian culture 
and lifestyle, were also thought to be reasons why mafia members favour 
the Netherlands (KLPD, 2011).  
 However, Italian police officers we interviewed largely dismissed those 
factors and stated that all North-Western European countries are similar in 
these respects. Instead, they pointed to a second explanation: the fact that 
in the Netherlands – as in Spain – fugitives can continue to play a useful 
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role in drug trafficking operations. Several indications support this expla-
nation. It was observed, for instance, that some mafia fugitives maintained 
contacts with South-American cocaine suppliers. Latitanti also supported 
mafia members who visited the Netherlands to negotiate drug deals, and 
assisted drug and money couriers who came to the country. In several 
cases, large sums of cash were found when the police apprehended a fugi-
tive, much more than was necessary for covering the costs of living, and 
possibly intended for buying drugs.  
 
g. Mafia infiltration in the former Netherlands Antilles 
 
The Cerca Trova project was limited to the Netherlands itself, but the me-
dia have reported on several cases of mafia infiltration in what were then 
the Netherlands Antilles. These refer to the islands of Sint Maarten and 
Curaçao, which have held an independent status within the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands since 2010, although the judiciary and the police, for example, 
remain the responsibility of the Dutch authorities. It must be noted that 
Dutch legislation does not include provisions for convicting a person of 
mafia membership, and that all persons mentioned below have always de-
nied being part of – or even affiliated with – the mafia.  
 On Sint Maarten, reports of mafia infiltration date from as early as the 
1970s (De Jong and Voskuil, 2017). This started when Sicilian business-
man Rosario Spadaro bought a hotel which he developed into a casino. 
Spadaro was linked to the Italian-American Cellini family, which partici-
pated in the illegal gambling operations of Meyer Lansky. Originally, one 
of the Cellinis co-owned the casino, but the Dutch authorities had refused 
him an operating licence. From unknown sources, Spadaro then raised 
money to buy out Cellini and gradually acquired a substantial number of 
properties and businesses on the island. Inevitably, warm contacts devel-
oped between Spadaro and local top politicians, culminating at the end of 
the 1980s in a joint venture for expanding the island’s airport and harbour. 
Italian companies were hired to do the construction work, whilst Italian 
banks provided funding. Companies set up by Spadaro and his political 
friends inflated the costs of the projects by €18,8 million and in 1995, Spa-
daro was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for this fraud (De Jong 
and Voskuil, 2017).  
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 At the end of the 1970s, another Sicilian native named Gaetano Corallo 
also appeared on Sint Maarten to open a gaming house. He already owned 
several casinos in Italy and sought to expand his business to the Nether-
lands Antilles. In 1983, however, he was suspected of working for the Cosa 
Nostra’s Santapaola clan and fled to Florida, where he was arrested and 
extradited to Italy in 1989. By that time, he had already entrusted his son 
Francesco with the Sint Maarten casino (De Jong and Voskuil, 2017). Over 
the following years, the younger Corallo acquired casinos in several coun-
tries, and he also became one of the largest operators of electronic gaming 
machines in Italy. He too developed close relations with politicians in the 
Netherlands Antilles, most noticeably Gerrit Schotte, who in 2010 became 
the first prime minister of (semi) independent Curaçao. Almost immedi-
ately after taking office, Schotte faced increasingly severe allegations of 
corruption. These also implicated Corallo, who was suspected of having 
financed Schotte in return for an important public position (GHJ, 2017).  
 The Dutch public prosecution service started an investigation and the 
Italian authorities provided information in which Corallo, although he had 
never been convicted, was identified as a mafia member and accused of 
being involved in drug trafficking and money laundering (De Jong and 
Voskuil, 2017). In August 2012, Corallo was put on Interpol’s red notice 
list. In 2016, the court sentenced Schotte to three years’ imprisonment for 
accepting bribes from Corallo, and the sentence was confirmed on appeal 
in July 2017 (GHJ, 2017). In December 2016, Dutch authorities arrested 
Corallo and, after having spent eight months in pre-trial detention, he was 
extradited to Italy on charges of large-scale tax evasion, money laundering 
and bribery, related to his gambling machines. However, the Italian judici-
ary apparently failed to build a credible case against him, because in Italy, 
Corallo’s pre-trial detention was discontinued immediately upon his arri-
val. When his passport was also returned to him in July 2018, he returned 
to Sint Maarten, prompting quite a few raised eyebrows (Zwart, 2018; An-
tilliaans Dagblad, 2018). Dutch authorities had expected that Corallo 
would receive a long prison term in Italy, but must now decide whether to 
prosecute him for bribing Schotte.  
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
Based on the information available, Cerca Trova confirmed that the Italian 
mafia is indeed active on Dutch territory, particularly the ‘Ndrangheta and 
Camorra. Almost all activities are related to the drug trade, for which sev-
eral clans have maintained a stable presence in the Netherlands since the 
1980s. Its members regularly visit the country to negotiate with drug sup-
pliers and to organise shipments, or perform similar tasks while hiding 
from the Italian police or rival clans. The mafia has access to, or has estab-
lished, a supporting infrastructure, for instance in the shape of restaurants 
where meetings can be organised safely, and companies in economic sec-
tors that are useful for trafficking drugs, such as the flower trade. Individ-
uals, Italian as well as Dutch nationals, provide assistance such as housing 
and transport.  
 However, there is always a risk that criminals who are present in a coun-
try for one reason seek to expand their business for their own reasons. The 
fact that ‘Ndrangheta members thought it a good idea to start ordering 
flowers without paying for them illustrates this. Given the risks involved, 
it is hard to imagine that a sensible and well-organised crime syndicate 
managing things from Italy would have allowed them to do so, given the 
risk of detection.  
 Occurrences in the former Netherlands Antilles demonstrate the disrup-
tive effect mafia infiltration may have when economies are weak and au-
thorities lack integrity. Of course, any person who invests substantial sums 
in a local economy will rapidly build influence with politicians. If the latter 
are prone to corruption, the relationship may be misused to acquire gov-
ernment contracts or positions. Although this opens the way to classic ma-
fia-type crimes, it does not necessarily require a mafia organisation; any 
white-collar criminal might do the same. Once again, we cannot assess 
whether, for instance, Francesco Corallo was under the direct control of 
Sicilian ‘masters’ or was operating independently.  
 In the Netherlands, the Italian mafia is not an ‘invasive exotic’. It did 
not attempt to take over existing illegal markets or to open new ones. In-
stead, in the drug trade we mostly see close cooperation with Dutch and 
other criminals. Involvement in the flower trade and possibly the Italian 
catering branch did not spark conflict with the indigenous criminal under-
world.  
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 A protective factor for the Netherlands seems to be the lack of a sub-
stantial Italian community originating from the southern part of Italy. Most 
Italian immigrants who came to the Netherlands after the First World War 
and have since acquired Dutch citizenship, come from the north of Italy. 
The number of Italian nationals is about 50.000 and thus rather small, and 
it is partly made up of students and others who reside in the Netherlands 
temporarily. There are no concentrations of Italians in specific neighbour-
hoods. This makes it much harder for the mafia to parasitize on their fellow 
countrymen than, for instance, in Germany, Canada and Australia – coun-
tries with relatively large and concentrated communities originating from 
southern Italy.  
 In the Netherlands, the Italian mafia has not introduced more effective 
or more violent methods of organised crime. Since 2002, the mafia has 
virtually refrained from openly committing murders on Dutch territory and 
indications of extortion-related violence and threats are almost non-exist-
ent. When it comes to applying methods to avoid detection and prevent 
enforcement agencies from acquiring evidence, the picture is rather mixed. 
The police did notice mafia members who were very apprehensive of being 
wiretapped and followed, and they also used false identities. However, 
Dutch criminals apply the same methods. Remarkably, other mafia mem-
bers hardly took any precautions to avoid being identified, and some fugi-
tives even used their real names. Furthermore, it only took a phone call to 
Italy to tie businessmen such as the Corallos and the Crupis to the mafia. 
Although they were running a legal business on paper, this does not seem 
to match the image of a highly professional criminal organisation trying to 
set up shop abroad and remain undetected.   
 It is important to discuss whether the available information indeed 
paints a reliable picture of the mafia’s activities on Dutch territory. Within 
the Cerca Trova team, this question was from time to time fiercely debated. 
To begin with, a general weakness of information collected by law enforce-
ment is that it mostly represents investigative priorities and does not nec-
essarily provide insight into the full range of activities of the criminal un-
derworld (Hobbs and Antonopoulos, 2014). Apart from that, police infor-
mation may be flawed by practical issues. As mentioned above, most cases 
included in the Cerca Trova database had Italian letters rogatory as a start-
ing point and these usually emphasise illegal activities which are known 
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priorities in the requested country, to ensure maximum assistance. There-
fore, property crimes and trafficking of marijuana, which hardly spur the 
Dutch public prosecutors into action, may have been mentioned less than, 
for instance, cocaine. In addition, crimes without a direct international link, 
such as extortion of local businesses, may not be visible at all in interna-
tional assistance requests. Also, peculiarities of the Dutch Police Infor-
mation Act (Wet Politiegegevens) made it difficult to obtain information 
older than five years, and if questions arose, it was sometimes problematic 
to find additional material regarding old cases. However, a more funda-
mental issue in organised crime research – or any study of an ‘invisible’ 
illegal activity – will always be to what extent missing information implies 
that no substantial problems exist, or instead that we are dealing with ex-
tremely smart criminals.  
 Some Cerca Trova team members held the latter opinion, which they 
underpinned, among other things, by pointing to statements delivered by 
collaboratore di giustizia such as Cerfeda and Basile about hitherto un-
known crimes they had committed in the Netherlands. In addition, Italian 
police officers explained that in some cases, only far-reaching long-term 
investigations had supplied the necessary evidence, and that this had re-
quired, for instance, wiretapping of hundreds of subjects. According to 
them, it was particularly difficult to prove crimes of collusion, with Rome’s 
mafia capitale case as an example. Of course, such efforts had been im-
possible in the context of Cerca Trova, and this deeply frustrated several 
team members who felt they had had no proper chance to uncover what 
was potentially hidden.  
 Others, including the author, took a more pragmatic approach. Alt-
hough organised crime groups are sometimes compared to secret societies, 
it is very unlikely that they can keep their activities completely hidden, 
whilst at the same time exerting highly disruptive effects on society. It may 
be necessary to go to great lengths to acquire evidence to prove your case 
in court, but here we were only looking for indications of mafia activity. If 
the mafia had indeed infiltrated deeply into the Dutch economy, or had for 
decades systematically applied methods such as extortion, chances are slim 
that enforcement agencies would not have received any signal at all. In 
fact, intelligence on mafia activities in the Netherlands had been consistent 
since the 1990s. Infiltration of legitimate businesses and politics did indeed 
succeed in the former Netherlands Antilles, but this merely proves the 
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point that politicians who are susceptible to corruption are vulnerable to 
any type of villain, mafia affiliated or otherwise. So far, we have no indi-
cations that in the Netherlands itself it is equally easy to find influential 
politicians who would not mind colluding with the mafia. 
 Regardless of how one views the question of whether Cerca Trova did 
or did not provide the full picture, the project made it clear that the Italian 
mafia’s activities in the Netherlands should be monitored and disrupted 
where possible. As a follow-up, a small police team was established for 
this purpose.  
 In the context of the debate on globalisation of organised crime, we may 
conclude, however, that developments in the past three or four decades 
have not structurally changed the market for the Italian mafia in the Neth-
erlands, and that the mafia has not managed to alter the indigenous Dutch 
criminal underworld or (even partly) replace it.  
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